Inside a Gentlemen Ransomware-Linked Intrusion

Contributors: Archana Manoharan, Meena Madhavan, Aparna Kunnath Ajayan, Dhanunjaya Vuppala

Executive Summary

A deception alert triggered by the scanning of decoy backup infrastructure exposed a multi-week intrusion that began with valid credentials used through an internet-facing Citrix virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) environment. The credentials had appeared in a stealer-log prior to the first confirmed external sign-in, and multifactor authentication (MFA) was not enforced on the access path at the time. Once inside, the threat actor expanded activity across virtual desktops, mapped the Active Directory (AD) environment, staged tools, performed large-scale account enumeration, and accessed files containing plaintext secrets.

The intrusion escalated from initial credential theft to domain-level control: a previously disabled privileged account was reset and re-enabled, privileged passwords were changed, and a service identity was added to the Domain Admins group. Outbound SFTP sessions were also observed.

Technical Details

Initial Access Through Compromised Credentials

Credentials for a legitimate user appeared in a stealer-log approximately five days before the first confirmed external Citrix login. An external public IP address (174.138.180.146) was subsequently associated with remote-interactive access to multiple virtual desktops. Because MFA was absent on this access path, valid credentials alone were sufficient to establish a desktop session. This activity is consistent with valid-account abuse rather than the exploitation of a Citrix software vulnerability.

Domain and Network Discovery

Within minutes of gaining initial access, the operator executed standard Windows commands to identify the logged-in context, network routes, domain trusts, domain controllers, local administrators, and domain privileged groups. The attacker also probed dozens of infrastructure systems, including domain controllers, backup servers, and database-related assets.

A list of command-line instructions mapped to security information like domain administrator control, network segments, and account privileges, often analyzed during investigations of stolen credentials.

Tool Transfer and Masquerading

The threat actor obtained tools through public file-sharing services and staged them in user-profile directories. A copy of SoftPerfect Network Scanner was renamed to masquerade as a Windows service executable (MSInstallService.exe), while PowerShell scripts supported account and computer discovery. FileZilla and its SFTP helper (fzsftp.exe) were also executed.

File / indicatorDetail
MSInstallService.exeC:\Users\<redacted>\Pictures\ and \Documents\SAP\SAP GUI\ ; SHA256 c7513c97463246e693424e64943983bd49e6d8aa86b1e8fb4a98a437ae8bfef1
Users.ps1C:\Users\<redacted>\Pictures\Users.ps1 ; SHA1 f6cb1b634e69b2f1dda725051df0d93f5c2d60e0
comp.ps1C:\Users\<redacted>\7498\Pictures\comp.ps1 ; SHA1 6410edbfa1ac3723650b20b6176f55abf5c621aa
filezilla.exeC:\Program Files\FileZilla FTP Client\filezilla.exe ; SHA1 63e6dafa76b3156916bcb175f6b01531a31173bf
Staging URLshxxps://temp[.]sh/ ; hxxps://gofile[.]io/ ; hxxps://send-anywhere[.]com/ ; hxxps://temp[.]sh/p1TXO/*.zip
Process evidencefilezilla.exe > fzsftp.exe -v

Active Directory Enumeration

A PowerShell-driven loop issued approximately 41,000 domain-account lookups spanning employee, service, and privileged identities. Subsequent queries focused on high-value administrative, vault-related, VPN, and backup identities. The scale and focus of these queries indicate the targeted mapping of privilege escalation and lateral movement pathways.

Command line instructions used by a domain administrator to query user accounts and VPN access groups, including lists of targeted IDs and CyberArk accounts potentially exploited by Gentlemen Ransomware.

Credential Access and Validation

The operator browsed network shares and opened files containing plaintext passwords, tokens, and provisioning scripts. Several harvested privileged credentials were tested against domain-controller sharesโ€”such as SYSVOL and IPC$โ€”resulting in recorded failed authentication attempts. All exposed secrets discovered in these files should be treated as compromised.

CategoryFiles opened (examples)
Plain-text passwords\\<redacted>\e\server user ID Password.txt ; \\<redacted>\e\Scrum Do not delete\login details.txt ; \\<redacted>\d\password admin.txt ; \\<redacted>\d\password user1.txt ; \\<redacted>\d\pass.txt ; \\<redacted>\d\User2 password.txt ; \\<redacted>\User\Passwords.txt ; …\msolve password.txt
Tokens / keys\\<redacted>\c$\Users\Administrator\Desktop\Sentinel one\<redacted> site token.txt ; \\<redacted>\…\Sentinel one\<redacted> site token.txt ; \\<redacted>\shared\Project_Access\projectadmin_Encrypted_Password.pwf
AD / identity scripts\\<redacted>\Share$\Windows_ID_creation.ps1 ; \\<redacted>\Share$\Windows agents\CyberApp_ID_Creation.ps1 ; \\<redacted>\User\removebatch.ps1 & assignbatch.bat ; \\<redacted>\e$\Certcheck.ps1
Other sensitive filesAccess-control and DC door-access lists, EDC access list, TMC access logbook, a PowerShell transcript from servers
Example process treeExplorer > NOTEPAD.EXE \\<redacted>\c$\…\<redacted> site token.txt ; notepad++.exe …\projectadmin_Encrypted_Password.pwf

Privileged Account Takeover

Using an already privileged identity, the operator reset and re-enabled a disabled Domain Admin account, expanded its permitted logon hours, and authenticated to a domain controller. In a separate interactive PowerShell session on a domain controller, the attacker reset additional privileged account passwords and added a service identity to the Domain Admins group, establishing durable domain-wide administrative persistence.

Command-line interface entries for โ€œnet use,โ€ โ€œnet user,โ€ and โ€œnet groupโ€ commands, showing domain administrator activity consistent with a cyber intrusion.

File Changes and External Communication

Telemetry documented the movement of directories on a file server under a privileged identity. FileZilla/SFTP generated approximately 270 connections to two external IP addresses (216.158.226.110 and 216.158.226.100) over TCP/22, alongside minimal FTP traffic over TCP/21 and additional traffic to 172.32.1.175. Because the content and volume of the transferred files could not be verified, these connections serve as indicators of potential data staging or transfer rather than definitive proof of exfiltration.

Evidence itemDetail
External servers216.158.226.110 and 216.158.226.100 โ€“ SFTP/22 (~270 connections) + a few FTP/21
Other destinations172.32.1.175 (external)

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

TechniqueObserved behavior
T1078 / T1133Valid credentials through external remote services
T1018 / T1482 / T1069.002Host, trust and privileged group discovery
T1105 / T1036Tool transfer and renamed scanner
T1087.002Large-scale domain account discovery
T1552.001 / T1039Credentials in files and network share access
T1098 / T1098.007Password resets, account enablement and group membership
T1021.002Attempts to use privileged credentials over SMB
T1048External SFTP communications; data content unverified

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TypeIndicatorContext
IPv4174.138.180.146External Citrix login source
IPv4216.158.226.110Observed SFTP destination
IPv4216.158.226.100Observed SFTP destination
IPv4172.32.1.175Additional destination
Domaintemp.sh; gofile.io; send-anywhere.comObserved staging services; shared-use infrastructure
URLhxxps://temp[.]sh/p1TXO/*.zipStaged archive
SHA-256c7513c97463246e693424e64943983bd49e6d8aa86b1e8fb4a98a437ae8bfef1Renamed scanner sample
SHA-2561b9badb1c646a19cdf101ac4f6fdd23bc61eaab8c9f925eb41848cea9fd0738eSecond scanner sample
SHA-1f6cb1b634e69b2f1dda725051df0d93f5c2d60e0Domain enumeration script
SHA-16410edbfa1ac3723650b20b6176f55abf5c621aaDiscovery script
SHA-10e67c37e46fd0b0ee2b761e120694cec5ea80a98Renamed scanner
SHA-163e6dafa76b3156916bcb175f6b01531a31173bfFileZilla binary observed; not inherently malicious

Hunting Query

Domain and Trust Reconnaissance

endpoint.os = 'windows' and (src.process.cmdline contains 'nltest /domain_trusts' or src.process.cmdline contains 'nltest /dclist' or src.process.cmdline contains 'route print' or src.process.cmdline contains 'net group' or src.process.cmdline contains 'net user')

Mass Domain-Account Enumeration

endpoint.os = 'windows' and (src.process.cmdline contains 'net user' or src.process.cmdline contains 'Users.ps1' or src.process.cmdline contains 'Get-ADUser')

Tool Staging and Masqueraded Scanner

endpoint.os = 'windows' and (src.process.name = 'MSInstallService.exe' or src.process.cmdline contains 'Users.ps1' or src.process.cmdline contains 'comp.ps1' or src.process.cmdline contains 'temp.sh' or src.process.cmdline contains 'gofile.io' or src.process.cmdline contains 'send-anywhere.com')

Credential Access from Network Shares

endpoint.os = 'windows' and (src.process.cmdline contains 'IPC$' or src.process.cmdline contains 'SYSVOL' or src.process.cmdline contains 'net use' or src.process.cmdline contains 'password' or src.process.cmdline contains 'credential')

Privileged Account Resets and Group Changes

endpoint.os = 'windows' and (src.process.cmdline contains 'Domain Admins' or src.process.cmdline contains '/active:yes' or src.process.cmdline contains 'Set-ADAccountPassword' or src.process.cmdline contains 'Enable-ADAccount' or src.process.cmdline contains 'Add-ADGroupMember' or src.process.cmdline contains '/add /domain')

FileZilla/SFTP Execution and Transfer Tools

endpoint.os = 'windows' and (src.process.name = 'fzsftp.exe' or src.process.name = 'filezilla.exe' or src.process.cmdline contains '216.158.226.110' or src.process.cmdline contains '216.158.226.100' or src.process.cmdline contains '172.32.1.175')

Persistence and Privileged Administrative Activity

endpoint.os = 'windows' and (src.process.cmdline contains 'schtasks /create' or src.process.cmdline contains 'New-ScheduledTask' or src.process.cmdline contains 'net localgroup administrators' or src.process.cmdline contains 'Add-LocalGroupMember' or src.process.cmdline contains 'reg add')

To mitigate the attack vectors observed in this intrusion and prevent similar credential-based escalations, security teams should prioritize the following containment, hardening, and detection measures:

  • Enforce strong authentication: Require phishing-resistant MFA and conditional access policies on all internet-facing Citrix/VDI and privileged access paths, and investigate stealer-log exposures promptly.
  • Contain compromised identities: Revoke active sessions, reset compromised credentials, rotate all secrets discovered in shared files, and review service-account delegation and vault access.
  • Audit privileged accounts: Review Domain Admins and other privileged groupsโ€”along with recent account enablements, password resets, and logon-hour changesโ€”reverting unauthorized modifications and auditing domain-controller access.
  • Harden administrative workflows: Restrict the interactive use of privileged service identities by enforcing tiered administration, privileged access workstations (PAWs), and just-in-time (JIT) elevation.
  • Eliminate exposed secrets: Remove plaintext passwords and tokens from file shares and scripts, transitioning to managed secrets storage with strict access auditing.
  • Restrict execution and detect anomalies: Block executable and script launches from user-writable directories, and configure alerts for renamed network scanners, mass account enumeration, and unexpected PowerShell activity on domain controllers.
  • Investigate outbound traffic: Review proxy, firewall, DNS, and FileZilla logs for connections to the listed external destinations to determine whether data was transferred before declaring exfiltration.
  • Safeguard backup infrastructure: Protect backup administration with isolated credentials, immutable or offline recovery copies, and alerting on unusual backup-account queries or configuration changes.
  • Preserve telemetry and correlate detections: Retain VDI, domain controller, EDR, deception, SFTP, and Windows security logs, and build multi-event detections that correlate remote logon, enumeration, privilege changes, and outbound transfers.

Conclusion

This intrusion highlights how quickly threat actors can turn a single stealer-log exposure into full Domain Administrator control when internet-facing Citrix environments lack MFA and plaintext secrets remain accessible on network shares. Because the attacker relied heavily on valid credentials and legitimate administrative tools, early deception triggers and deep behavioral telemetry proved critical to uncovering the activity before ransomware could be deployed.

Moving forward, organizations must strengthen identity-first defenses by enforcing phishing-resistant MFA, auditing privileged group modifications, and removing hardcoded credentials from shared repositories. For security teams looking to stay ahead of credential-driven intrusions, the CyberProof combines advanced threat hunting, proactive threat exposure management, and MITRE ATT&CK-mapped detections to identify and contain lateral movement before adversaries reach critical domain infrastructure.